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Reviewed by Michael Buehler, Lecturer in Comparative Politics, SOAS, University of London, 
Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG E-mail: mb107@soas.ac.uk  
   Scholars working on Southeast Asia have had a keen interest in local politics years before 
calls to “scale down” research on democratization to the subnational level had reached 
mainstream political science.i Hence, there is a rich literature on autocrats, bosses, “little kings” 
and strongmen who have managed to stay in power over consecutive election cycles and now 
populate the lower rungs of Southeast Asia’s political systems. Most of the early works on 
strongmen in the region saw the origins of their rule in individualized exchanges of goods for 
political support.ii Subsequent works set out to correct this image of local strongmen as 
benevolent local patrons by emphasizing the coercion and violence that many of these political 
entrepreneurs frequently deployed in order to gain and maintain power in local politics.iii  
 However, political anthropologist Yoshinori Nishizaki argues that on many occasions the 
political longevity and resilience against defeat at the ballot box these figures show is neither the 
result of patronage nor coercion. Rather, local strongmen often stay in power because their rule 
(re-)shapes the social identity of voters. Concretely, people seek to enhance the status and 
prestige of the communities of which they are members. If politicians manage to positively 
influence people’s perception of themselves and the group they belong to, people will support 
such politicians at the ballot box. 
 To test this hypothesis, Nishizaki follows the political career of Banharn Silpa-archa 
(               ), who has dominated politics in Suphanburi (          ) ever 
since he was elected in 1976 to represent this province north of Bangkok in the national 
parliament. Born as Tek Chiang Chaebe (马德祥) in 1932 into an affluent local Chinese family, 
he moved to Bangkok as an adolescent and subsequently made a fortune in the construction 
industry during the 1960s. In the 1970s he returned to Suphanburi to launch his political career 
that continued at the time of writing. 
 Based on interviews and a close reading of Thai language newspapers, the author argues 
that Suphanburi has long been perceived as one of the poorest and least developed provinces in 
Thailand. Consequently, Thai living outside the province where belittling Suphanburi as 
“backward”, while locals perceived the central state as a “body devouring” development funds 
that were supposed to go to their jurisdiction (p. 48). Soon after taking up this post in the national 
parliament, Banharn began to channel national funds into the construction of hospitals, schools, 
and roads in his home province. In addition, he established various “welfare charities” pledging 
to support destitute Suphanburians. Finally, Banharn financed projects that were of high 
symbolic value to locals, Nishizaki shows, including the purchase of a fourteenth-
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century Sangkhalok bowl, a ceramics priced by the local population, and which had been taken 
by the national government in Bangkok. Banharn also sponsored local dramas such as “The 
Blood of Suphan” that showed the provinces historical greatness. Such activities in combination 
with constantly touring the province for “on-the spot-inspections”, always accompanied by an 
entourage of journalists, have changed citizens’ perception not only of Banharn but also of 
themselves. Nishizaki provides countless anecdotes that show how Suphanburians have begun to 
speak of their province in favorable terms, pointing out the many “victories” that have been 
achieved over other provinces ever since Banharn came to power, including “better roads”, 
“cleaner towns” and “hard-working bureaucrats” thanks to the discipline Banharn has injected 
into the local state apparatus through his frequent impromptu visits to government departments. 
Nishizaki also describes how local citizens defend their parliamentary representative against 
corruption allegations or other attempts to question the moral integrity of Banharn. The shared 
experiences of traveling on newly built roads, being collectively engaged emotionally in the 
dramatic “rescue” of cultural artefacts from sinister Bangkok elites in combination with being 
constantly reminded about Barnhan’s many other good deeds by signboards on hospitals, schools 
and other public buildings have created an imagined community locals can positively identify 
with and to which they have begun to refer to as Banharn-buri. This “provincial pride” (p. 24), 
and the resulting emotional support for Barnharn is so strong, that he continues to win elections 
without having to resort to coercion, violence or vote-buying at the individual level, Nishizaki 
argues.   
Several conclusions can be drawn from Nishizaki’s in-depth account of the career of one 
of Thailand’s most successful rural politicians. One, the democratization of rural Thailand has 
been cast in too negative terms in previous studies. Political dynamics in Suphanburi show that 
subnational politicians may not be the socially debased local bosses whose rule is solely based 
on violence, coercion, electoral fraud and the distribution of private patronage. In “Banharn-
buri”, election related violence is notably absent as is individual vote-buying according to the 
author. Two, the study under review here also exposes the simplistic and Western-centric 
understanding of “progress” many “community-driven” foreign development projects are based 
on in Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries.iv At the time of writing, Suphanburians 
remained relatively poorer than their counterparts in other industrialized Thai provinces, 
Nishizaki shows. Yet residents in the province do not blame Banharn for this lack of economic 
growth (p. 188). The study provides a fascinating account of how locals understand development 
and how this creates accountability dynamics that are based on a notion of service delivery that 
differs profoundly from Western development agencies. Three, Nishizaki’s portrait of Banharn 
challenges the theoretical underpinnings of many existing studies on rural politicians in Thailand 
and other parts of Southeast Asia. For instance, Nishizaki’s account of the “non-material 
dimension” (p.26) of Banharn’s material contributions to Suphanburi province challenges 
rational choice approaches to local clientelism, which see political behavior driven by individual 
material interests only. The author’s findings from Suphanburi province suggest that voters may 
support politicians even if they do not greatly improve citizens’ economic situation. Similarly, 
the argument put forward also challenges Marxist approaches. Class consciousness and, by 
extension, class tensions are absent in Suphanburi, according to Nishizaki’s account. Instead, if 
not necessarily shaped by traditional patronage relations, emotional bonds between affluent 
politicians and the masses determine politics in the province. 
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Overall, the situation Nishizaki describes for Suphanburi is reminiscent of the kind of 
“brand politics” that have become so ubitiquous around the globe in recent years. In many 
democracies, particularly at the local level, politicians have abandoned parties because they “no 
longer see mass parties as able to offer a persuasive ideology, significant resources, or the 
organizational support needed to win elections.”v Consequently, much like marketing managers 
are branding a product, politicians style themselves in a fashion they hope will win them public 
support, without spending too much thinking on actual programs or the implementation of 
concrete policies. In other words, very much like the decision about buying a Brioni raincoat is 
not determined by considerations about the functionality of the garment (a raincoat from 
Hennes& Mauritz would serve the same purpose for much less money), voters support brand 
politicians as a means of acquiring an identity rather than in the hope of receiving tangible 
benefits or because of concrete policy proposals. In other words, “[b]y acquiring the product, 
consumers aspire to become different people… A successful brand also helps to differentiate the 
candidate from the competition. Hence, the brand must innovate: it aims to awaken interest by 
surprising the voter…”vi 
 
Nishizaki claims that there is no shortage of Banharn-like figures in Asia and compares 
him to figures such as Kakuei Tanaka, Japan’s former prime minister who was ousted for 
corruption but nevertheless remains very popular in his home prefecture of Niigata (p. 220); 
South Korea’s Kim Dae Jung who remains popular in Jeolla province for lifting it from 
“backwardness” and Ferdinand Marcos who is fondly remembered in his home-province of 
Ilocos Norte as a figure who had a transformative impact on the region. In fact, one does not 
need to venture this far back to find similar figures in the region. Brand politicians have cropped 
up across democratizing Southeast Asia in recent years. Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand, 
Benigno Aquiono III in the Philippines and Joko Widodo in Indonesia have become hugely 
popular by successfully branding themselves as innovators and visionaries determined to 
“change” politics but actually offering very little in terms of concrete policy programs or 
solutions to their countries many problems.vii 
 
Nizhizaki’s research therefore points towards much needed research on such brand 
politicians and how they generate support from below, particularly in light of the relatively 
minor role election related violence has come to play in the regionviii but also the fact that 
demands for patronage far outstrip the financial means of most candidates.  
 
However, structural factors, which are given short shrift in this study under review here, 
need to be placed at the center of such a research enterprise. Nizhizaki admits that Barnhan’s 
political career is pretty unique in Thailand. For instance, Narong Wongwan (      
        ), aka the “godfather of Phrae province”, a businessmen who holds assets in the 
tobacco industry and also has strong links to the drug trade in Thailand’s northern regions, would 
have had the resources and contacts to follow a strategy similar to Banharn’s. Yet, Wongwan’s 
reign over the province was less durable due to “lack of political will”, according to Nizhizaki (p. 
217). However, Nizhizaki’s account also suggests that Wongwan’s political machine and the 
“brand politics” he followed began to unravel when the US increased its anti-drug efforts in the 
region, which shrank Wongwan’s economic base. In short, local socio-economic conditions may 
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play an important role in determining the longevity of subnational political machines and the 
brand politics surrounding it.  
Likewise, future research has to examine more closely why exactly people support such 
politicians. While Nizhizaki’s focus on “the electorate” and its motivations offers a fresh 
perspective to scholarship on local strongmen that focuses mostly on elites, the author says 
surprisingly little about the composition of local electorates but simply treats it as a homogenous 
bloc. Again, socio-economic conditions seem to play an important role in whether brand politics 
are an option for local politicians or not. The “economic autonomy” of voters, for instance, plays 
a crucial role in determining the leverage politicians have over the electorate.ix Arguably, in 
provinces where local socio-economic conditions create “locked-in” electorates, politicians have 
no need to engage in brand politics as captive voters have to support them anyway. 
 
Even if the electorate is fairly autonomous economically, therefore forcing politicians 
who cannot rely on patronage to engage in “brand politics”, existing research on “brand politics” 
showed that “a good brand resonates with the public, but there is a high level of uncertainty and 
error in assessing a brand’s potential resonance…”x How receptive electorates are to “brand 
politics” is another reason for why future research on the politics of social identity needs to 
disaggregate “the electorate”, as the composition of local populations may determine what kind 
of “brand politics” emerge and whether they help politicians to stay in power. Recent research on 
local strongmen suggests that, in fact, different classes think very differently about pork-
barreling or highly symbolic (but expensive) prestige projects conducted in the name of 
“development”.xi Brand politics of the kind Banharn pursued in Suphanburi may therefore not be 
very successful in more affluent provinces. Future research will need to show whether brand 
politics are simply adjusted to such local circumstances or abandoned altogether if the electorate 
is more affluent.   
 
Overall, Nishizaki innovate study points to new directions in the study of local strongmen 
in Southeast Asia and beyond. Strongmen may stay in power for decades not due to coercion, the 
distribution of patronage or the adoption of actual policies that improve the socio-economic well-
being of the electorate but rather because they strike a chord with the aspirations, dreams and 
hopes of local electorates. However, such research on the politics of social identity needs to 
examine whether the mass of voters is really the amorphous, web-likexii entity the author portrays 
it to be or whether the electorate is actually structured along socio-economic (or other) 
dimensions, with important consequences for the kind of brand politics described in this book. 
Nishizaki’s book also raises new and important research questions about the sustainability of 
“brand politics”. As the author points out, Banharn has failed to routinize or institutionalize his 
rule in Suphanburi province and it is therefore unlikely that his children will take over after his 
death (p. 200). Brand politicians, in other words, struggle to entrench themselves to the degree 
strongmen do whose power is rooted in patronage and/ or coercion. The Thai case is therefore an 
important starting point for emerging discussions in scholarship on Southeast Asian politics that 
introduced elections more recently. While the growing visibility of families and national 
politicsxiii has prompted discussion about the Philipinization of Indonesiaxiv, given the absence of 
election related violence in Indonesia and the relative economic autonomy of most of Indonesia’s 
electorate, it is arguably more accurate to speak of a “Thailand-ization” of the country’s politics, 
with “brand politicians” struggling to entrench themselves and their families in politics. In other 
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words, local strongmen need to be differentiated into “brand politicians” and “bosses/ local 
autocrats” since the power bases of these two types is very different with potentially important 
consequences of the democratization of politics. While the former may be able to entrench 
themselves in politics, the latter’s grip to power seems to be temporary and allow for the 
possibility of other players to emerge in the local political arena.   
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